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Abstract—This work characterizes an important solution con-
cept of a relevant spectrum game. Two energy-efficient sources
communicating with their respective destination compete for an
extra channel brought by a relay charging the used bandwidth
through a pricing mechanism. This game is shown to possess
a unique Nash bargaining solution, exploiting a time-sharing
argument. This Pareto-efficient solution can be implemented
by using a distributed optimization algorithm for which each
transmitter uses a simple gradient-type algorithm and alternately
updates its spectrum sharing policy. Typical numerical results
show to what extent spectral efficiency can be improved in a
system involving selfish energy-efficient sources.
Keywords: resource allocation, cognitive radio, cooperative
transmission, Nash bargaining solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing spectrally efficient communication systems has
always been, and still is, a critical issue in wireless networks.
The need for energy-efficient terminals at both the mobile and
fixed infrastructure sides is more recent but becomes stronger
and stronger. This paper precisely considers both aspects.
More specifically, the main goal is to determine an energy-
efficient operating point of a given distributed communication
system at which the spectrum is efficiently used. We do
not pretend to solve this tough issue for general distributed
multiuser channels. Rather, we show that it is possible to fully
determine such an operating point in one possible scenario
which has already been considered in the literature [1]. This
scenario is as follows. We consider an initial communication
system comprising two point-to-point communications which
use orthogonal channels (say in the frequency domain); a half-
duplex relay using a dedicated band is added to the system in
order to help the two transmitters to improve their energy-
efficiency; the relay implements a pricing mechanism which
is directly related to the amount of band used for relaying.
The energy-efficiency metric under consideration is a quantity
in bit correctly decoded per Joule and is defined as in [2]. The
situation where each transmitter aims at selfishly maximizing
its individual energy-efficiency (with pricing) by allocating
bandwidth on the extra channel on which the relay operates has
been considered in [1] ; the solution concept considered therein
is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is shown to be unique but
not Pareto efficient. Our goal is to consider another solution
concept for this spectrum allocation game of interest namely,
the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), motivated by the need
to design efficient solutions in distributed wireless networks.
Remarkably, such a solution exists for the considered scenario,
is unique, and can be implemented in a decentralized manner
according to the conjugate gradient algorithm. This confirms
the relevance of this approach which has also been adopted in
other contexts such as [3] (NBS for power allocation games
where transmission rates are optimized with no relay and pric-
ing), [4] (wireless sensors are energy-efficiently coordinated by
the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to communicate with a
unique fusion center), or [5] (multiple access channels without
pricing are considered). Compared to these references, the
present work makes a step towards implementing an efficient
solution in a decentralized manner, which is known to be a
challenging task [6][7]. The algorithm proposed in this paper
is decentralized in the sense of the decision but not in terms
of channel state information (CSI), leaving this issue as a non-
trivial extension of this work.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
introduce the system model as well as the spectrum allocation
game. In section III, we analyze the NBS and present the
decentralized algorithm. In section IV, numerical results are
presented and discussed. Concluding remarks are proposed in
section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System model
The communication system under study is represented in
Fig. 1. Source/transmitter i ∈ {1, 2} sends a signal √pixi with
power pi over two quasi-static (block fading) links: the link
from source i to destination i whose channel gain is hii ∈ C
and the one from the source i to the relay r whose channel gain
is hir ∈ C. The total band associated with those two links is ω
and the extra band allocated by source i to communicate with
the relay is denoted by ωi ∈ [0, ω]. The extra band available
is precisely that offered by the relay. The relay operates in a
half-duplex mode and is assumed to implement an amplify-
and-forward (AF) protocol. Time is divided into blocks on
which all channel gains are assumed to be fixed. Each block is
divided into two sub-blocks [8]. Over the first sub-block (first
phase), only the source can transmit and the signals received
by the destination and relay nodes are given by:{
yii = hii
√
pixi + nii,
yir = hir
√
pixi + nir,
(1)
where nii and nir are (complex) additive white Gaussian
noises (AWGN) with mean 0 and variance σ2. Following the
relevant choice of [8], only the relay is assumed to transmit
over the second sub-block (second phase):
yri = hri
√
prxri + nri, (2)
where hri ∈ C is the channel gain between the relay and
destination i, nri ∼ N (0, σ2), and xri is the transmitted signal
from the relay to destination i and, under the assumption made
in terms of relaying protocol, expresses as:
xri =
yir
| yir | . (3)
In the first transmission phase, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
associated with the source-destination channel i merely writes
as:
γi,i =
pi|hii|2
σ2
. (4)
The SNR associated with the second transmission phase is
given by [1], [8]:
γr,i =
pipr|hir|2|hri|2
σ2(pi|hir|2 + pr|hri|2 + σ2) . (5)
Interestingly, as proven by [8], when using maximal-ratio com-
bining, the equivalent SNR corresponding to the AF protocol
can be written in a simple form if the outage probability is
the metric of interest. This writes as: γAFi,i = γi,i + γr,i.
(a) Direct transmission.
(b) Cooperative transmission.
Figure 1: System model.
B. Strategic form of the spectrum allocation game
As motivated in [1], the spectrum allocation problem can
be modeled by a strategic form game (see e.g., [7]).
Definition 1: The game is defined by the ordered triplet
G = (K, (Si)i∈K, (ui)i∈K) where
– K is the set of players. Here, the players of the game are
the two sources/transmitters, K = {1, 2};
– Si is the set of actions/strategies. Here, the strategy of
source/transmitter i consists in choosing ωi in its strategy
set Si = [0, ω];
– ui is the utility function of each user. It is given by:
ui(ω1, ω2) = α
(ω − ωi)
pi
f(γi,i) + α
ωi
(pi + pr)
f(γAFi,i )
−b

 2∑
j=1
ωj

ωi, (6)
where α defines the spectral efficiency (in bit/s per Hz), f :
[0,+∞)→ [0, 1] is a sigmoidal efficiency function which can
correspond to the packet success rate or probability of having
no outage (emphasizing the link between energy-efficiency and
the outage analysis conducted in [8]). The parameter b is a
(linear) pricing factor.
As explained in [1], the presence of the factor b ≥ 0 amounts
to imposing a cost to the sources for using the relay; this cost is
assumed to be proportional to the relaying band used. The first
term of the utility function corresponds to the ratio between
the goodput (net rate in bit/s) to the cost in terms of power
(in J/s) for the direct link alone (whose band width equals
ω−ωi), whereas the second term corresponds to the aggregated
effects of the direct transmission and the relayed transmission
(whose bandwidth equals ωi). This game is concave in the
sense of Rosen and has a unique pure NE (see e.g., [7]).
The main problem is that the NE can be very inefficient as
there exist some operating points at which both transmitters
have better utilities. This motivates the study of more efficient
solutions such as the NBS. The NBS analysis, the design of
a simple distributed optimization algorithm to implement it,
and proving its relevance in terms of performance constitute
the main results of this paper.
III. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION ANALYSIS
The objective of this section is to characterize the NBS of
the game G and to propose a simple distributed optimization
algorithm for implementation since the function of interest to
optimize can be checked to be strictly concave under certain
operation conditions explicated in Sec. III-D.
A. Achievable utility region: Pareto boundary and convexity
First, we study the properties of the achievable or feasible
utility region, which is denoted byR. It is defined as the region
formed by all the points whose coordinates are (u1, u2) that
is:
R = {(u1, u2) | (ω1, ω2) ∈ [0, ω]2}. (7)
For a given channel configuration or block of data (i.e., the hij
are given), the region R is compact [3], which follows from
the compactness of Si and the continuity of ui. However, it is
not always convex. This prevents one from using bargaining
theory which is based on the convexity of the achievable utility
region. It turns out that, in the problem under consideration, it
is relevant to exploit time-sharing (as done in [3] for Shannon-
rate efficient allocation games on the interference channel),
which convexifies the utility region. Indeed, the main idea is to
assume that coordination in time is part of the sought solution.
The new utility region is:
R¯ ={(µu1 + (1− µ)u′1, µu2 + (1− µ)u′2)
|0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, (u1, u2) ∈ R, (u′1, u′2) ∈ R}.
(8)
During a fraction µ of the time, the users use (ω1, ω2) to have
(u1, u2). During a fraction (1−µ) of the time, they use another
combination of bandwidths (ω′1, ω
′
2) to obtain (u
′
1, u
′
2). Note
that this region includes several points of interest. First, it
includes
(
uNE1 , u
NE
2
)
which is the point corresponding to the
unique pure NE of G. Second, it includes the two points for
which the sources or transmitters do not exploit the relay at
all: ω1 = 0 or ω2 = 0. Let R¯∗ be the Pareto boundary of the
convex hull R¯. Fig. 2 illustrates different operating points as
well as the achievable utility regionR and the Pareto boundary
R¯∗. The other elements shown in this figure are defined next.
Figure 2: The achievable utility region plus some key
operating points.
B. Existence and uniqueness analysis of the NBS
The NBS can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 1: In the spectrum allocation game G, there
exists a unique NBS given by:(
uNBS1 , u
NBS
2
)
= max
(u1,u2)∈R¯+
(u1 − uNE1 )(u2 − uNE2 ), (9)
where
R¯+ = {(u1, u2) |u1 ≥ uNE1 , u2 ≥ uNE2 }. (10)
Proof: The point
(
uNE1 , u
NE
2
)
defines a threat point and
can always be reached, which ensures the existence of a
solution to the above maximization problem.
Regarding to the uniqueness of the NBS, Nash proved that
it holds under certain axioms due to the existence of the
convex hull of the achievable region and the threat point, as
mentioned in [3]. As we have shown that the utility region
can be convexified, this solution is also unique.
Finally, the cooperative outcome (NBS) must be invariant
to equivalent utility representations, symmetric, independent
of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficient [9]. The NBS is
therefore the unique solution resulting from the intersection of
the Pareto boundary R¯∗ with the Nash curve which is defined
as (Fig. 2):
(u1, u2) = arg max
(u1,u2)
π(u1, u2) (11)
where π(u1, u2) = (u1−uNE1 )(u2−uNE2 ) is the Nash product
function.
Since the NBS determination is on the subregion R¯+, we
stress that the utilities arising from the NBS are higher than
those deduced with NE (see Fig. 2).
C. Decentralized algorithm for the NBS determination
The proposed algorithm is based on the idea of determining
analytically the unique maximum, which is the NBS from the
resolution of the following system of equations:
(I)


∂π
∂ω1
= 0,
∂π
∂ω2
= 0.
(12)
Mathematical resolution of such a system leads to solve
two second degree polynomials in ωi (for i ∈ {1, 2}), the
discriminants of which are fourth degree polynomials in ωj
(for j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}). The study of signs of the discriminants
show that expressing the NBS analytically is a difficult task
even by exploiting Ferrari and Cardan methods for high
degree polynomials resolution. This study shows the interest
in: (1) finding decentralized algorithms to compute the NBS;
(2) designing distributed procedures to converge towards the
NBS. The scope of this paper is about (1) and (2) but with
the restriction that distribution is only performed in terms
of decision and not in terms of channel state information.
Instead of determining the maximum of π, we propose to
find the minimum of −π, denoted after as πm, by focusing
on the conjugate gradient algorithm. One of the steps of this
algorithm consists in determining a parameter denoted as
βk+1 (which is defined next). Accordingly, many methods
have been introduced such as: Fletcher-Reeves, Polak-Ribie`re
and Hestenes-Stiefel. Due to the efficiency of its convergence,
we focus here on the second method based on calculating the
Polak-Ribie`re parameter [10]. The spectrum sharing policy
is updated in an alternating manner, just like the iterative
sequential iterative water-filling algorithm [11]. However, in
contrast with the latter, only the decision is distributed here
and global channel state information is needed (through the
Hessian matrix).
Algorithm 1: Decentralized determination of the NBS
(1) Set the position of the relay
(2) ω0 = (ω01 , ω
0
2) (frequency initialization)
(3) v0 = −∇πm(ω0) (initialization gradient)
(4) k=0; while ‖vk‖ > ǫ
a. tk = − g
t
kvk
vtkAmvk
(optimal parameter with Newton method
where gk = ∇πm(ωk), Am is the Hessian matrix of πm and
ωk = (ωk1 , ω
k
2 ) is the frequency bands at the k
th iteration)
b. ωk+1 = ωk + tkvk (new frequency bands)
c. ωk+11 = ω
k+1(1) and ωk+12 = ω
k(2) (alternated updates)
d. gk+1 = ∇πm(ωk+1) (new gradient)
e. βk+1 =
gtk+1(gk+1 − gk)
gtkgk
(Polak-Ribie`re parameter)
f. vk+1 = −gk+1 + βk+1vk (new descent direction)
k = k+1
end
(5) (ωNBS1 , ω
NBS
2 ) = (ω
FI(1), ωFI(2)) where FI denotes
Final Iteration
D. Convergence of the algorithm (Strict-concavity analysis of
the π function)
The proposed algorithm is ensured to converge to a NBS
if π is strictly concave. But this property is not always true.
According to the previous study, the function π is defined
on the subregion R¯+ which is formed by all the utilities
(u1, u2) verifying ui ≥ uNEi for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Such a set
can be determined when the NE point is fixed. Though, for
each channels values, a NE can be identified. Consequently,
the subregion R¯+ depends on the channels values. In the
following, for given locations of sources and destinations, we
show that there exists a region in which the π function is
strictly concave.
Proving the strict-concavity of π amounts to proving the
strict-negativity of the eigenvalues of its corresponding Hes-
sian matrix, which is given by:
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, (13)
where:
a11 =
∂2π
∂ω21
= −2b(u2 − uNE2 )− 2bω2(−ϕ1 + ψ1 − b(2ω1 + ω2)),
a22 =
∂2π
∂ω22
= −2b(u1 − uNE1 )− 2bω1(−ϕ2 + ψ2 − b(2ω2 + ω1)),
a12 =
∂2π
∂ω1∂ω2
= −b(u2 − uNE2 )− b(u1 − uNE1 ) + b2ω1ω2+
(ϕ1 − ψ1 + b(2ω1 + ω2))(ϕ2 − ψ2 + b(2ω2 + ω1)),
a21 =
∂2π
∂ω1∂ω2
= a12,
with ϕi = αf(γi,i)/pi and ψi = αf(γ
AF
i,i )/(pi + pr) for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, the eigenvalues are the zeros of the
following polynomial:
P : λ2 − λ tr(A) + det(A). (14)
If we denote ∆ the discriminant of the polynomial P , we can
verify merely that ∆ is always positive. Indeed, we have:
∆ = (a11 − a22)2 + 4a12a21. (15)
Since a12 = a21, equation (15) is equivalent to:
∆ = (a11 − a22)2 + 4(a12)2 ≥ 0. (16)
Therefore, the eigenvalues of A, denoted as λ1 and λ2 are real
and are as follows:

λ1 =
tr(A)−√∆
2
,
λ2 =
tr(A) +
√
∆
2
.
(17)
From these expressions, we study the the strict negativity of
the eigenvalues depending on the relay position in a space
region [0, 700] × [0, 700] m2. The corresponding simulations
(for the same settings considered in section IV) are given in
Fig. 3 in which we represent in black the region where the
eigenvalues are strictly negative. We assume a standard choice
for f for all the numerical results provided in this paper which
is f(x) = (1−e−x/2)M [2] whereM is the number of symbols
per packet. Therefore, we can deduce that the strict concavity
of function π is ensured in a region (xr, yr) ∈ [400, 550] ×
[400, 550] m2.
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Figure 3: Strict-concavity of the π function on the disk Rsc
when both eigenvalues are strictly negative.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we implement the NBS and compare it to the NE
[1]. We consider a scenario where the coordinates (in me-
ter) of each source/destination nodes Si/Di are as follows:
S1(300, 300), D1(500, 645), S2(390, 257) and D2(590, 603).
The channel gains |hij |2 are given by 0.097/d4 where d is the
distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The noise
power and transmission powers of the users and relay are
10−13 Watt, 0.1 Watt and 0.08 Watt respectively, and α is
set to 0.8 bit/s per Hz. The constants b and M are set to 10−5
and 80 respectively, while the bandwidth ω is fixed to 1 MHz.
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Figure 4: Gains in terms of individual bandwidth for user 1
when operating at the NBS instead of the NE.
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Figure 5: Gains in terms of system/total bandwidth by
operating at the NBS instead of the NE.
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Figure 6: Gains in terms of sum energy-efficiency with
pricing (social welfare) by operating at the NBS instead of
the NE.
Our results highlight that the NBS requires less bandwidth
than the NE. Additionally, the energy-efficiency (with pricing)
at the NBS is higher than the one at the NE. In Fig. 4,
we represent the relative bandwidth gain (NBS vs NE) in
% of user 1 w.r.t. the coordinates of the relay (the relative
gain of user 2 shows a similar behavior). Simulations show
that maximum gains are obtained when yr ∈ [400, 550] m.
Moreover, for different yr, there are some regions of xr where
the gains vanish. In these regions, the optimum bandwidth
with NBS is equal to that with NE. Since user 1 cannot profit
from the presence of the relay (when this latter is far from
the source), we have ωNE1 = ω
NBS
1 = 0. However, user 2
maximizes its utility at the NE (when the relay is much closer
to its location) and we have ωNE2 = ω
NBS
2 6= 0. This shows
that our analysis provides some insights to an operator who
would like to optimize the location of a relay.
In Fig. 5, we plot the gain in terms of total bandwidth
demand. Thus, we deduce that a maximum gain with NBS is
reached when the relay is positioned at (xr, yr) ∈ [400, 550]×
[400, 550] m2. In this region, the total bandwidth demand is
reduced to 20− 25%. The study of the social welfare in Fig.
6 confirms that the maximum energy-efficiency (with pricing)
gain, which is around 10−12%, is reached in the same region.
Consequently, the results obtained according to the strict-
concavity analysis are well confirmed when implementing the
conjugate gradient algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studies an efficient solution for a relevant game
introduced in [1] by referring to the NBS. Remarkably, up to a
time-sharing argument, the corresponding spectrum allocation
game can be checked to possess all the properties to have a
unique NBS. Through implementing a conjugate gradient al-
gorithm in a decentralized way, considerable gains of 20−25%
can be obtained in terms of used bandwidth. The results
reached for the two-user case are very encouraging to extend
the case study to larger multi-user systems. Interestingly, our
analysis gives some insights into how to deploy some relays
for improving a distributed network both from a spectral
and energy standpoint. This paper is a first step towards
designing fully distributed algorithms (in terms of channel
state information) or learning techniques which converge to ef-
ficient solutions such as the NBS or Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution ; this task is known to be challenging and this paper
shows the existence of relevant wireless scenarios where this
objective might be reachable.
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